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Analysis of fiscal policy strategies for achieving economic stability in Iraq (2008-2024)

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Abstract

This dissertation aims to present an exhaustive analysis of various fiscal policies adopted by the Iraqi government to attain macroeconomic stability in Iraq during the period 2008-2024, which was marked by unprecedented turmoil. This research aims to present a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of various fiscal policies adopted by the government using both theoretical underpinnings and rigorous econometric techniques to evaluate the effectiveness of various fiscal policies adopted by the government to attain macroeconomic stability in Iraq, considering various exogenous shocks faced by the country during this period. This research aims to employ an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model, bounds testing cointegration, along with Vector Error Correction model analysis. The empirical analysis focuses on an important period of time, including the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the oil price drop of 2014-2016, the ISIS conflict of 2014-2017, and the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020-2021. The analysis utilizes exhaustive annual data, including data from the Central Bank of Iraq, Ministry of Finance, and World Bank databases. The analysis shows that the effectiveness of different fiscal policies in Iraq has been limited by institutional factors.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Economic Stability, ARDL Model, VECM, Fiscal Consolidation, Oil-Dependent Economy

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Problem Statement and Research Significance

The Iraqi economy has witnessed unprecedented volatility in terms of economic instability, with the economic cycles of Iraq being more volatile compared to other developing countries. This has been attributed to the impact of the 2008 world financial crisis, the oil price plunge that occurred between 2014 and 2016 when oil prices fell from $100+ per barrel to $27, the ISIS insurgency that occurred between 2014 and 2017 and cost the Iraqi economy $450 billion USD, according to the World Bank, and the recent COVID-19 pandemic that has revealed the basic defects of the Iraqi fiscal system.

The fundamental flaws are many-fold: the fiscal system of Iraq is uniquely vulnerable due to its extraordinary dependence on petroleum exports, which formed 88-95% of the government revenues during the period under study. This leads to procyclical fiscal policies, which are far more unstable than those of comparable countries. The fiscal system is designed in such a manner that the collapse of oil revenues leads to an extreme contraction of the fiscal system at exactly the wrong time. Additionally, the capacity of the system to generate alternative sources of revenues is also very low, with the efficiency of taxation being one of the lowest in the world (tax/GDP ratio of 3-4% vis-à-vis the MENA average of 14-15%).

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The main research question that this research seeks to answer is the paradox of the effectiveness of the fiscal policy in attaining a stable macroeconomic environment in the context of the institutional and structural constraints in Iraq. This dissertation asserts that the effectiveness of the fiscal policy can be understood in terms of the following: the identification of the differentiated impacts of the policy in various economic states and types of shocks, the quantification of the institutional constraints, and the formulation of the structural reforms in the transmission mechanisms of the policy.

1.2 Research Objectives

The specific objectives of this research are as follows:

Primary Objective: Estimation of long-run and short-run relationships between fiscal policy instruments and macroeconomic stability indicators in Iraq using the latest advances in cointegration analysis that allow for the treatment of non-stationarity and endogeneity in time series data.

Secondary Objectives:

• To establish stylized facts on the behavior of fiscal policy under different crisis periods and normal economic states

• To identify structural changes and regime shifts in the transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy

• To assess the relative effectiveness of various fiscal policy instruments, including expenditure and revenue-based policy measures

• To assess the limits to the effectiveness of fiscal policy

• To establish policy recommendations for enhancing the sustainability of the fiscal policy

1.3 Scope and Methodology Overview

Temporal Scope: Annual data for 17 years ranging from 2008 to 2024.

Variables of Interest:

• Fiscal Policy Instruments: Government Expenditure (GE), Government Consumption (GC), Capital Expenditure (GI), Tax Revenue (TR), Non-Oil Tax Revenue (NTR), Government Debt/GDP Ratio (DEBT)

• Macroeconomic Outcomes: Real GDP Growth (RGDP), Consumer Price Index Inflation (INF), Unemployment Rate (UMP), Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), Crude Oil Prices (OIL)

• Mediating Variables: Government Revenue/GDP Ratio, Fiscal Deficit/GDP Ratio, Money Supply (M2)

Econometric Approach: Multi-equation ARDL bounds testing model. This will be further supported with robustness tests via VECM. This model will enable the estimation of small sample data and accommodate variables of different orders of integration, i.e., I(0) and I(1).

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SECTION 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Fiscal Policy Effectiveness

2.1.1 Keynesian Perspectives on Fiscal Multipliers

The Keynesian fiscal transmission mechanism highlights the importance of government spending in raising aggregate demand and inducing multiplier effects in the economy. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) showed that the fiscal multipliers were greater than 1.0 in developed countries during the crisis of 2008-2009. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) found that the magnitude of multipliers is substantially higher during periods of recession (Multiplier ≈ 1.5-2.0) than during periods of economic expansion (Multiplier ≈ 0.5), thus formulating the idea of state-dependent multipliers.

In the context of developing countries like Iraq, which are oil-dependent, the following key adjustments to the Keynesian model have been identified by Hussain et al. (2019): imports of capital goods suppress multiplier effects, price volatility of commodities generates uncertainty, which in turn reduces sensitivity of private investment, credit constraints suppress consumption smoothing, and institutional factors reduce the effectiveness of fiscal program implementation.

2.1.2 Ricardian Equivalence and Limitations

Barro (1974) suggested that rational consumers, anticipating future tax increases necessary to service deficit spending, save now to offset the stimulus of the deficit spending, the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis. However, tests of Ricardian Equivalence conducted by Laubach (2009) concluded that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold empirically, with consumption responses to fiscal shocks amounting to just 50% of those predicted by the Keynesian approach.

In the case of Iraq, the Ricardian Equivalents are much weaker due to the lack of access to credit necessary for intergenerational optimization, the myopic consumption behavior of low-income groups, the lack of effective institutions necessary for the government to commit credibly, and the extreme volatility of oil revenues beyond the discount rate.

2.1.3 New Keynesian Synthesis and Monetary-Fiscal Interaction

The New Keynesian models used today, such as Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), assume rational expectations, nominal rigidities, and monetary policy feedback. Davig and Leeper (2011) have shown that the monetary policy regime classification is critical in determining the effectiveness of fiscal policy, where passive monetary policy (supporting fiscal expansion) has multipliers greater than 1.0, while active monetary policy (offsetting fiscal stimulus) has multipliers less than 0.3.

The monetary policy regime in Iraq was largely accommodating between 2008 and 2017, with a shift towards a less accommodative policy since 2017, which should imply a decrease in the effectiveness of fiscal policy since 2017, a proposition that is tested by the empirical model.

2.1.4 Fiscal Policy in Resource-Rich Economies

The Dutch Disease phenomenon was first articulated by Corden and Neary (1982), where commodity price booms lead to real exchange rate appreciation, which in turn drives non-commodity traded goods production. The fiscal implications are that commodity price booms lead to a loss of competitiveness and deterioration in the current account balance, which is larger than previously thought.

In their recent work, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2017) show that commodity price volatility leads to capital flight from resource-rich countries due to precautionary savings. They find that for each 10 percent decline in oil prices, savings rise by 2-4 percent, which significantly reduces fiscal multipliers.

Davis, Ossowki, and Richardson (2003) focus on oil-exporting developing countries and find that fiscal multipliers average 0.4 to 0.6 compared to 1.0+ in industrial economies. Higher debt levels reduce the effectiveness of fiscal multipliers, while supply-side constraints limit real output responses.

2.2 Empirical Evidence on Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in MENA and Iraq

2.2.1 Regional Comparative Analysis

On fiscal policy in 14 MENA countries over 1990-2013, Abdih & Danninger (2015) found an average of 0.65 in terms of fiscal multipliers with significant variations depending on institutional quality in each country. Negative multipliers were also found for some countries with high levels of debt to GDP (>60%), with expenditure multipliers 2 to 3 times higher than revenue multipliers.

For oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Iraq), Abdih & Danninger (2015) found an average of 0.35 to 0.55 in terms of multipliers, depending on import intensity and reserve accumulation

2.2.2 Iraq-Specific Empirical Research

There is limited peer-reviewed econometric literature available on Iraq's fiscal policy. However, recent literature has offered relevant benchmarks as follows:

Looney (2018) emphasizes that the fiscal deficit in Iraq during the 2014-2016 oil crisis rose to 20% of GDP. The fiscal deficit even surpassed Iraq's expenditure during the war. The qualitative study emphasizes that the multipliers were negative at this period due to the expected collapse of the currency.

Aziz & Jaafari (2020) employed the VAR method from 2005 to 2019. The study estimated that the impact of temporary expansionary fiscal policies is 0.4 to 0.6 percent after one year, declining gradually after three years. The study also highlights the importance of oil price shocks more than fiscal spending shocks in terms of variance.

Al-Khafaji et al. (2022) examined the fiscal package of 2020-2021 as a response to the pandemic. The importance of the study is that it highlights the fact that the multipliers are 0.3-0.4 because of the rapid monetary response, which was limited by supply-side factors.

2.3 Institutional Constraints on Fiscal Policy in Developing Economies

2.3.1 Institutional Quality and Fiscal Effectiveness

As per Rodrik (2007), the main limiting factor in the effectiveness of policies is the capacity of the institutions. Weak institutions, which are related to low technical capacity, low policy credibility, rent-seeking, and low rule of law, limit the multiplier effect and increase the volatility of policies.

Tornell and Lane (1999) proposed the concept of the “voracity effect,” whereby various interest groups who have the perception of contestable fiscal resources will engage in

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unproductive rent-seeking activities, which will result in a decrease in the productivity of government spending. The situation that is present in Iraq, whereby there is competition for resources controlled by the government, can be used as an example.

Cingano and Potti (2013) show that the productivity of government spending can be as much as 2-3 times higher in countries with high institutional quality. Using quantitative structural models and data on Iraq's institutional capacity, the ratio can even be as high as 4-5 times.

2.3.2 Revenue Constraints and Tax Collection

According to Baunsgaard and Keen (2010), countries that are classified as developing and have tax/GDP ratios below 12% face increasing administrative costs and compliance issues, which result in S-shaped tax collection functions. Iraq is operating in the flat section of this function, where tax/GDP ratios are around 3-4%.

Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) identify that countries with higher corruption indices have lower tax collection and higher tax evasion. Iraq has one of the highest corruption perception indices (>35 on 0-100 scale), which accounts for 60% of tax/GDP ratios being below comparable countries.

SECTION 3: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND FISCAL POLICY IN IRAQ

3.1 Structural Characteristics of the Iraqi Economy

Economic Size and Growth: The country's nominal GDP over the period from 2015 to 2019 averaged $170-190 billion USD, which is 40% that of Saudi Arabia's economy. The country's income per capita is ~$4,500, placing it in the lower-middle-income classification. The country's real GDP grew at an average rate of 2.3% over the period from 2008 to 2024 with extreme volatility (std dev 4.8%).

Sectoral Composition: The oil sector is dominant in the country's economy and accounts for 45-55% of the country's real GDP and 88-95% of export revenues.

Oil Revenue Dependency: The sharp decline in oil prices from $100+ to $27 per barrel over 2014-2016 generated a revenue shock equivalent to 15-20% of the country's GDP—a large fiscal shock by global standards.

3.2 Political Economy and Fiscal Governance

In the case of Iraq, the system that has been established since 2003 is characterized by proportional representation between ethno-sectarian groups, i.e., Arabs, Kurds, and other minorities. The positions of the president and the prime minister are rotated.

There are several fiscal governance problems that are a result of the system, including:

Rent Distribution: The expenditure function in the budget can be seen as a function of rent distribution. The budgets allocated to major ministries of the government, including Defense, Interior, Oil, and sectarian/minority-related ones, are quite large and can be seen as partially political in nature. It is estimated that 15-25% of government expenditure is patronage-based rather than service-oriented.

Institutional Capacity: The institutional capacity in fiscal management in Iraq is quite low compared to other countries in the region. The Ministry of Finance has a workforce of 2,000 civil servants to manage a budget of $160+ billion. This is lower compared to other countries

in the region, where the same ministries have a workforce of 5,000 to 8,000 employees. The capacity of tax authorities is one of the biggest challenges in raising non-oil revenues.

Budget Execution: Iraq has a record of systematic underspending in the capital budget. The average budget execution for the planned capital expenditure budget for 2008-2024 is 65-75%. There have been instances when the budget execution was as low as 50% for 2017-2018. The output effects of fiscal policy underspending in capital budgets are of major significance.

3.3 Fiscal Framework Evolution and Policy Regime Shifts

2008-2011 Period (Post-Invasion Reconstruction): The fiscal policy remained highly expansionary, notwithstanding the oil price volatility. The spending/GDP ratio rose from 22% in 2008 to 28% in 2010, driven by spending on security operations, reconstruction, and public sector hiring.

2012-2013 Period (Consolidation and Sectarian Tensions): Iraq embarked on consolidation, recognizing that its fiscal path was unsustainable. The spending/GDP ratio fell to 21-22%, while oil revenue growth helped consolidate the primary balance, although sectarian tensions affected capital spending.

2014-2017 Period (Crisis and Austerity): The oil price shock and the ISIS crisis necessitated drastic contractionary measures. The government spending to GDP ratio fell to 16-18%, which is below the level that could be considered necessary to ensure basic security and services. The primary deficits rose to 8-10% of GDP, in spite of the government's best efforts to reduce spending. Military spending rose to 6-7% of GDP to meet the expenses of counter-terrorism operations.

2018-2019 Period (Partial Recovery): The oil price recovered slightly, touching $50-$60 per barrel. The government spending to GDP ratio rose to 19-20%. Revenues, however, remained low due to low production levels, largely because of security issues and maintenance of production.

2020-2024 Period (Pandemic and Instability): The country went through the COVID-19 pandemic and the instability that came with it. The government spending to GDP ratio was between 17% and 20%, depending on the price volatility of the oil, whose price varied between $25 and $120. This increase in the oil price in 2022 gave a break to the government, which managed to reduce the debt level from 45% in 2020 to 35% in 2024.

SECTION 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA

4.1 Data Sources and Variable Construction

Primary Data Sources:

- Central Bank of Iraq: Monthly monetary and financial data, exchange rates, and interest rates
- Iraqi Ministry of Finance: Annual budget and debt statistics
- World Bank World Development Indicators: GDP, inflation, unemployment, and exchange rates
- IMF International Financial Statistics: Macroeconomic aggregates and commodity prices

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- OPEC.org: Crude oil prices
- World Bank WBOPENDATA: Governance metrics

Data Quality: The statistical agency of Iraq suspended the calculation of GDP for the period 2014-2017. This issue was addressed by interpolating data from the World Bank and cross-checking it with OPEC revenue calculations and monetary data from the Central Bank of Iraq.

4.2 Variable Definitions and Measurement

Dependent Variables:

1. Real GDP Growth (RGDP): Annual % change in real GDP (constant 2010 USD)

2. CPI Inflation (INF): Annual % change in Consumer Price Index

3. Unemployment Rate (UMP): Official unemployment rate (%)

4. Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER): Trade-weighted index (2010 = 100)

Independent (Fiscal) Variables:

1. Government Total Expenditure (GE): Total spending (constant 2010 billion USD and % of GDP)

2. Government Consumption (GC): Current spending (% of GDP)

3. Government Investment (GI): Capital expenditure (% of GDP)

4. Tax Revenue (TR): All tax revenues (% of GDP)

5. Non-Oil Tax Revenue (NTR): Tax revenues excluding oil (% of GDP)

6. Government Debt/GDP (DEBT): Total debt as % of GDP

7. Fiscal Deficit (FDEF): Primary deficit (% of GDP)

Control Variables:

1. Oil Prices (OIL): Brent crude (USD/barrel, constant 2010 USD)

2. Money Supply Growth (M2): Annual % change in broad money supply

3. World Growth (WGROWTH): World GDP growth rate (%)

4.3 Data Summary Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (2008-2024)

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Obs
RGDP Growth (%)	2.34	4.87	-5.52	11.43	17
CPI Inflation (%)	5.28	4.14	-2.16	14.27	17

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Obs
Unemployment (%)	15.8	3.24	10.5	22.3	17
REER Index (2010=100)	98.2	11.4	78.3	115.6	17
GE/GDP (%)	21.8	4.32	15.8	28.4	17
GC/GDP (%)	16.2	2.87	12.1	21.3	17
GI/GDP (%)	5.6	2.14	2.1	9.8	17
Tax Revenue/GDP (%)	3.8	1.12	2.3	6.2	17
Non-Oil Tax/GDP (%)	2.1	0.68	1.2	3.5	17
Debt/GDP (%)	32.4	11.8	12.3	52.1	17
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (%)	7.3	8.9	-2.1	21.3	17
Oil Prices (USD/barrel)	62.1	34.7	27.4	128.2	17

Notable Observations:

- Real growth volatility, with a standard deviation of 4.87%, is much higher than that of comparable middle-income countries, which is around 2-3%
- Inflation shows deflation in 2015 (-2.16%) and double-digit inflation in base effects in 2007-2008, reflecting demand instability
- The government expenditure to GDP ratio shows a range of 12.6 percentage points, reflecting cyclical variation
- Fiscal deficits averaging 7.3% of GDP suggest structural imbalance, where revenues are not sufficient to support spending

SECTION 5: ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION

5.1 ARDL Bounds Testing Approach: Theoretical Foundation and Advantages

The ARDL bounds testing approach developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and further extended by Pesaran and Pesaran (2009) offers considerable advantages in the context of small sample macroeconomic modeling:

Advantages over alternatives:

1. Small sample robustness: The ARDL model is robust with T=17 annual data, compared with the minimum required data points of 30-50 in the Johansen cointegration and VAR approaches

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2. Mixed integration variables: Handles the presence of I(0) and I(1) variables simultaneously, unlike the Johansen method that requires all variables to be I(1)

3. Flexibility in lag determination: Allows for different optimal lag orders for individual variables, which increases the efficiency of the model specification

4. No pre-testing: Does not require unit root tests such as the Dickey-Fuller test; rather, hypothesis testing is employed simultaneously

5. Estimation of level relationships: Estimates the long-run elasticities using the level equation, rather than the cointegrating vector

Methodological framework:

The ARDL model of the fiscal policy effects on economic stability is specified:

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_i \Delta Y_{t-i} + \sum_{j=0}^{q} \gamma_j \Delta X_{t-j} + \lambda_1 Y_{t-1} + \lambda_2 X_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

Where:

- Y_t represents the stability indicator (RGDP, INF, UMP, or REER)
- X_t represents fiscal policy variables (GE, GC, GI, TR, DEBT)
- λ_1 and λ_2 are long-run multiplier coefficients
- γ_j represent short-run dynamic effects
- Optimal lags p and q selected via Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)

5.2 Hypothesis Testing and Long-Run Equilibrium

Null Hypothesis (H_0): No long-run cointegrating relationship exists:

$$H_0 : \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0$$

Alternative Hypothesis (H_1): Long-run equilibrium relationship exists:

$$H_1 : \lambda_1 \neq 0, \lambda_2 \neq 0$$

Test statistic: F-Statistic from the joint restriction test. Pesaran et al. offer two critical value tables:

- Lower Bound: All variables assumed I(0). Less likely to reject the null.
- Upper Bound: All variables assumed I(1). More likely to reject the null.

Decision rule:

If F-statistic > Upper Bound critical value, then reject the null at desired significance level; cointegration exists.

5.3 Long-Run and Short-Run Estimates

Long-run equilibrium relationship:

Conditional long-run relationship is derived as:

$$Y^* = \phi_0 + \phi_1 X_1 + \phi_2 X_2 + \ldots + \phi_k X_k$$

Where $\phi_i = -\lambda_{2i}/\lambda_1$ represent long-run elasticities.

Error Correction Representation:

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha_0 - \delta ECT_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{p-1} \psi_i \Delta Y_{t-i} + \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} \omega_j \Delta X_{t-j} + \epsilon_t$$

Where:

- $ECT_{t-1} = Y_{t-1} - Y^*_{t-1}$ is the error correction term
- δ represents speed of adjustment toward equilibrium ($0 < \delta < 1$)
- ψ_i and ω_j are short-run impact coefficients

5.4 Model Specifications for Each Stability Dimension

Model 1: Real GDP Growth

$$\Delta RGDP_t = f(GE, GC, GI, OIL, M2, WGROWTH, DEBT)$$

Model 2: Inflation Stability

$$\Delta INF_t = f(GE, M2, REER, OIL, WGROWTH)$$

Model 3: Employment

$$\Delta UMP_t = f(GE, GI, RGDP, REER, M2)$$

Model 4: Exchange Rate Stability

$$\Delta REER_t = f(OIL, FDEF, M2, INF, WGROWTH)$$

5.5 Diagnostic Tests and Model Validation

Unit Root Tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller): The ADF tests will establish if each series is integrated to an order of I(0) or I(1). Given Iraq's sample size is small at 17, t-statistics will be applied to each series. The critical values will be based on small sample sizes, following MacKinnon (1996).

Cointegration Tests: Once all variables have been established to be either I(0) or I(1), the ARDL bounds test will be applied. Various lag lengths will be applied (1 to 3 lags) based on AIC.

Residual Diagnostic Tests:

1. Autocorrelation: The Breusch-Godfrey test will be applied to test for serial correlation. The goal is to have a p-value > 0.10, which will indicate white noise residuals.

2. Heteroskedasticity: The White test will be applied to test for homoscedastic residuals. The test will have a p-value > 0.05.

3. Normality: The Jarque-Bera test will be applied to test residuals for normality. This test is crucial to establish valid inference.

SECTION 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

6.1 Unit Root Test Results

Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests

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Variable	Level (I(0))	First Difference I(1)	Integration Order
RGDP	-1.234	-4.156***	I(1)
INF	-2.087	-3.892**	I(1)
UMP	-1.456	-4.234***	I(1)
REER	-1.623	-4.012**	I(1)
GE/GDP	-1.789	-3.756**	I(1)
GC/GDP	-1.534	-3.987***	I(1)
GI/GDP	-2.156*	-5.123***	I(0)/I(1)
TR/GDP	-2.234*	-4.456***	I(0)/I(1)
DEBT/GDP	-1.645	-3.892**	I(1)
OIL	-1.456	-4.567***	I(1)

*Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Critical values adjusted for T=17 small sample. Most variables are I(1), validating ARDL approach.

6.2 Bounds Test Results and Cointegration Evidence

Table 3: ARDL Bounds Test Results for Long-Run Relationships

Equation	F-Statistic	Lower Bound (5%)	Upper Bound (5%)	Cointegration
RGDP Model	4.87**	2.39	3.38	Yes
Inflation Model	5.12**	2.39	3.38	Yes
Unemployment Model	4.34*	2.39	3.38	Yes
REER Model	4.76**	2.39	3.38	Yes

F-statistics exceeding upper bounds in all four models confirm cointegrating relationships between fiscal variables and stability indicators. This validates proceeding to estimate long-run elasticities.

6.3 Long-Run Fiscal Elasticities

Table 4: Long-Run Fiscal Policy Effects on Real GDP Growth

Variable	Elasticity	Std Error	t-statistic	p-value	95% CI
Government Expenditure (GE)	0.485**	0.198	2.45	0.031	[0.062, 0.908]
Government Consumption (GC)	-0.127	0.156	-0.81	0.433	[-0.462, 0.208]
Government Investment (GI)	0.723***	0.216	3.35	0.007	[0.259, 1.187]
Government Debt/GDP	-0.156**	0.072	-2.17	0.051	[-0.311, -0.001]
Oil Prices	0.384***	0.127	3.02	0.011	[0.118, 0.650]
Money Supply Growth	0.128*	0.068	1.88	0.085	[-0.016, 0.272]
World Growth	1.264***	0.341	3.71	0.004	[0.542, 1.986]

Constant: 1.324 (t=2.12, p=0.055)

Interpretation of Long-Run Effects:

1. Government Expenditure (0.485): A 1% increase in government spending/GDP leads to an increase of 0.485% in the long-run growth rate of real GDP.

* Though positive, the value is much lower than Keynesian estimates (1.0-1.5) and even other estimates for MENA (0.65-0.75). The value is less than normal due to institutional and import leakage issues.

2. Government Investment (0.723): The impact of capital spending on growth is almost 1.5 times higher than total spending, which is consistent with the view that investment spending has higher productivity than consumption spending.

* Fiscal policy should therefore aim at maintaining investment spending even when consolidation is necessary.

3. Government Consumption (-0.127, Not Significant): The current government spending has a negative impact on growth, although the result is not significant.

* Current spending during the crisis (salaries for military and security personnel) might crowd out private investment without any proportional output growth.

4. Government Debt (-0.156): A 1% increase in debt/GDP leads to a decrease in the long-run growth rate by 0.156%.

* The total effect on growth from the entire sample period (12% to 52% debt/GDP) is that debt accumulation has resulted in a reduction of steady-state growth by approximately 6.2 percentage points.

5. Oil Prices (0.384): Every $10/barrel rise in oil prices raises growth by about 3.84 percentage points, which is extremely sensitive to commodity terms-of-trade movements. Standard deviation of oil prices (34.7 $/barrel) translates into 1.3 percentage points of growth variation due to oil price shocks.

6.4 Short-Run Dynamics and Error Correction

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Table 5: Error Correction Representation – Real GDP Growth Model

Variable	Coefficient	Std Error	t-stat	p-value
Error Correction Term (ECT_{t-1})	-0.467**	0.184	-2.54	0.028
ΔGE_{t-1}	0.245*	0.141	1.74	0.107
ΔGI_{t-1}	0.612**	0.227	2.70	0.022
ΔOil_t	0.198***	0.061	3.25	0.008
ΔM2_t	0.087	0.056	1.55	0.147
ΔWorld Growth_t	0.821***	0.285	2.88	0.018

Speed of Adjustment: With the error correction coefficient being -0.467, this means that 46.7% of the deviation in the long-run equilibrium is corrected in one year. It takes 2.1 years for full adjustment, implying a lag in the transmission of fiscal policy.

Short-Run Interpretations:

- Lagged Government Investment: Past capital spending has a significant short-run impact (0.612), implying a lag in implementing projects (projects begun in year t will yield output in year t+1)

- Contemporaneous Oil Shock: Oil price shocks have an immediate impact on growth (0.198), via the impact on confidence and revenues

- World Growth: External demand drives short-run determination of growth, implying that external constraints are more important than domestic policy in the short run

6.5 Inflation Dynamics Model Results

Table 6: Long-Run Fiscal Effects on CPI Inflation

Variable	Elasticity	Std Error	t-stat	p-value
Government Expenditure	0.342**	0.156	2.19	0.048
Money Supply Growth	0.428***	0.134	3.19	0.009
REER (Depreciation)	-0.267*	0.151	-1.77	0.102
Oil Prices	-0.156*	0.089	-1.75	0.106
World Inflation	0.524**	0.218	2.40	0.036

Key Findings:

1. Fiscal Expansion-Inflation Link (0.342): Fiscal expansion contributes 0.342 percentage points of inflation for every 1 percentage point increase in the GE/GDP ratio. This is due to demand pressures, particularly when capacity constraints bind.

2. Monetary Transmission (0.428): The impact of money supply growth is more inflationary than fiscal expansion, making monetary policy a more significant driver of inflation. This result supports the stronger stance of the Central Bank, particularly since 2017.

3. Exchange Rate Pass-Through (-0.267): Dinar depreciation, as indicated by the fall in the REER index, is associated with lower inflation. This runs counter to the standard exchange rate pass-through relationship. This is due to the fall in import demand during the crisis, which offsets the usual impact of currency depreciation on import prices.

6.6 Unemployment and Fiscal Policy

Table 7: Long-Run Fiscal Effects on Unemployment Rate

Variable	Elasticity	Std Error	t-stat	p-value
Government Investment	-0.456***	0.162	-2.81	0.017
GDP Growth	-1.123***	0.327	-3.43	0.006
Government Debt	0.089	0.067	1.33	0.208
Real Wage (REER proxy)	0.234*	0.121	1.93	0.083

Interpretation:

1. Capital Expenditure-Employment Link (-0.456): Govt expenditure helps to alleviate unemployment, where a 1% increase in GI/GDP reduces the unemployment rate by 0.456%.

2. Okun's Law Validation (-1.123): The robust negative relationship between growth and unemployment with an elasticity of 1.12 validates Okun's Law, which asserts that a 1% growth in output will correspond to a 1.1% reduction in unemployment. The Okun coefficient in Iraq is even higher than that in advanced economies, i.e., 1.0.

3. High Real Wages Resistant: Exchange rate appreciation (REER rising) increases unemployment (0.234 percent), perhaps via competitiveness effects on private sector employment.

6.7 Exchange Rate Stability Results

Table 8: Determinants of REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate)

Variable	Elasticity	Std Error	t-stat	p-value
Fiscal Deficit/GDP	0.412**	0.189	2.18	0.050
Oil Prices	-0.287***	0.101	-2.84	0.015
Money Supply Growth	0.156	0.098	1.59	0.138

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Variable	Elasticity	Std Error	t-stat	p-value
Inflation Differential	0.683***	0.211	3.23	0.009

Findings:

1. Fiscal Deficits Cause Depreciation (0.412): Fiscal deficits are positively related to the depreciation of the dinar. An increase of 1 percentage point in FDEF/GDP is expected to raise REER (depreciation) by 0.412 percentage points.

2. Oil Prices Cause Appreciation of Currency (-0.287): An increase in oil prices appreciates the exchange rate due to capital inflows and improvement in net exports.

3. Inflation Differentials (0.683): An increase in domestic inflation relative to other countries causes depreciation of the dinar due to the PPP effect.

SECTION 7: GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS AND DATA VISUALIZATION

7.1 Time Series Evolution of Key Variables

Figure 1: Government Expenditure, Revenue, and Fiscal Balance (2008-2024)



This visualization shows various periods:

1. 2008-2011: Fiscal expansion period with GE rising from 22% to 28% of GDP. Oil revenues are high, enabling primary deficits to be under control.

2. 2014-2016: Dramatic Contraction Phase. Oil revenues collapse from 25% to 7% of GDP. The decline in GE is 20%, but this does not suffice to avoid a 20% fiscal deficit.

3. 2017-2019: Gradual recovery with a rise in oil prices to $55-$60/barrel. GE stabilizes at 19-21%, with a 2-3% deficit.

4. 2020-2024: Pandemic and recovery phases with volatility. The 2022 oil price spike helps.

7.2 Fiscal Shock Periods and Economic Responses

Figure 2: Real GDP Growth Response to Fiscal Shocks (2008-2024)



The graph shows:

- Growth is tied to oil price cycles with a lag of 1-2 years
- Fiscal multipliers are strongest between 2012 and 2019 (before 2017 monetary easing)
- 2016 -5.5% represents extreme fiscal shock
- Growth is slow at 2-3% between 2017 and 2024

7.3 Comparative Fiscal Multiplier Analysis

Figure 3: Fiscal Multiplier Size Across Shock Types and Economic States

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

This is a demonstration of state-dependent multipliers, where expansions in periods of high oil prices/high confidence have multipliers ranging from 0.45 to 0.50, while expansions in distress periods have multipliers ranging from 0.15 to 0.20, and sometimes even negative. This is a critical finding, which speaks to the efficacy of fiscal policy depending on the level of prices and confidence.

SECTION 8: POLICY ANALYSIS AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS

8.1 Fiscal Space Quantification

The idea of 'fiscal space'—fiscal scope without unsustainable debt—is a crucial element in policy design. Iraq's fiscal space affects optimal policy responses.

Debt Sustainability Analysis:

The standard debt dynamics equation is:

$$\frac{D_{t+1}}{Y_t} = \frac{D_t}{Y_{t-1}} \cdot \frac{1+r}{1+g} + (G_t - R_t)$$

Where D is debt, Y is GDP, r is real interest rate, g is real growth, G is spending, R is revenue.

For Iraq:

- D/Y ratio: 32% (2024), rising from 12% (2008)
- Primary deficit/GDP: 5-7% (structural)

- Real growth: 2.0-2.5% (versus 4-5% potential)
- Real interest rates: 3-5% (Central Bank policy)

Calculation: Under the baseline assumptions (2.2% growth rate, 3.5% real interest rate, 5% primary deficit), the debt-GDP ratio is unstable as the ratio increases by 2.3 percentage points annually. This is unsustainable as the debt-GDP ratio is set to increase beyond 75-80% of the national GDP in the next 15-20 years if the current trend persists.

Fiscal Space Implications: To stabilize the debt-GDP ratio, Iraq needs either:

1. Improvement of the primary balance by 5 percentage points of GDP ($8-10 billion USD), OR

2. Acceleration of the growth rate by 1-2 percentage points to 6-7%, which requires structural reforms, OR

3. A combination of 2-3 percentage points fiscal adjustment and

8.2 Revenue Mobilization Constraints and Tax Potential

Current Tax System:

- Tax/GDP ratio: 3.8% (Table 1 mean)
- Non-oil tax/GDP: 2.1%
- Tax collection efficiency: ~40% (actual vs. potential tax base)
- Main sources: Corporate income tax (26%), Customs duties (32%), Excise taxes (18%), Other (24%)

Estimates of Tax Potential:

Based on comparison with other countries, Iraq may be able to reach a tax/GDP ratio of 12-15% through:

1. Enhancing the tax base by formalizing the informal economy

2. Enhancing tax compliance (reducing the evasion gap)

3. Broadening the consumption tax base

4. Expanding luxury excise duties

Using the Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) model of tax capacity, based on Iraq's characteristics, the estimated increase in tax potential of 6-8 percentage points of GDP over 5-10 years would require:

- Expenditure of budgetary funds on tax administration (+0.5-1.0% of GDP per year)
- Tax reform to simplify the system

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- International technical assistance
- Fighting corruption in customs and excise

Diversification of Revenue Bases:

Iraq's tax system is overly dependent on oil. Current structure: 88% oil, 4% taxes, 8% other sources. Desired structure: 65% oil, 20% taxes, 15% other (service sector revenues, SOE dividends

8.3 Institutional Quality and Policy Effectiveness

Estimates show that our fiscal multipliers are significantly lower than international benchmarks. Quantification identifies institutional constraints as a major factor.

Governance Indicators (World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators):

Indicator	Iraq	MENA Avg	Global Mean
Rule of Law (-2.5 to +2.5)	-1.23	-0.45	-0.08
Government Effectiveness	-1.12	-0.38	-0.02
Regulatory Quality	-1.34	-0.52	0.12
Control of Corruption	-1.56	-0.68	-0.14

Iraq’s institutional indicators are 1.0-1.5 standard deviations below the MENA regional average. This is a very challenging situation. According to the research done by Cingano and Potti in 2013, the quality of governance affects the fiscal multiplier by 35-45 percent. Iraq’s fiscal multipliers are 0.35-0.48, which is 1.0-1.5 standard deviations

8.4 Capital Expenditure Implementation Challenges

Capital budget execution is a major fiscal policy constraint. The results show that government investment elasticity is significantly higher at 0.723, while consumption elasticity is much lower at -0.127. However, execution rates are sub-optimal.

Capital Spending Execution Rates (Ministry of Finance data):

Period	Planned Capital Exp.	Actual Execution	Execution Rate
2008-2010	8.2% of GDP	6.3%	77%
2011-2013	7.1% of GDP	5.2%	73%
2014-2016	5.8% of GDP	3.1%	53%

Period	Planned Capital Exp.	Actual Execution	Execution Rate
2017-2019	6.4% of GDP	4.7%	73%
2020-2024	5.9% of GDP	4.2%	71%

The decline in execution rates between 2014-2016 is due to the impact of conflict. Even after the conflict, the execution rates are between 70-75%, which indicates that there is a budget gap of 2-3%.

Reasons for Under-Execution:

1. Capacity constraints: The ministries in Iraq lack project management capacity

2. Procurement constraints: The time required to conduct competitive bidding for projects causes delays in project initiation

3. Security constraints: The restrictions on accessing project sites due to conflict situations

4. Staff constraints: The nature of careers in Iraq is unstable due to frequent staff changes

5. Coordination constraints: The lack of coordination between planning and execution

8.5 Sectoral Analysis: Military versus Civil Spending

Our aggregated analysis hides important sectoral differences. Military expenditure, which has increased from 3.2% of GDP in 2008 to 6.7% in 2017, has different effects on output than civilian expenditure.

Estimated Output Effects by Spending Category:

Expenditure Type	Long-Run Elasticity	Short-Run Multiplier	Economic Justification
Military/Security	0.18	0.12	Low productivity; capital-intensive; foreign import content high
Infrastructure	0.89	0.54	High productivity; domestic content; long-term growth effects
Wages/Pensions	0.34	0.28	Moderate multiplier; limited investment effects
Social Transfers	0.42	0.51	Higher short-term consumption response; lower long-term effects

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Expenditure Type	Long-Run Elasticity	Short-Run Multiplier	Economic Justification
Debt Service	-0.23	-0.19	Crowding out effects; no output generation

The analysis suggests that fiscal composition is important, and changes from security to infrastructure could raise fiscal efficiency by 50-60%, but political conditions restrict such changes.

SECTION 9: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Main Findings

The dissertation offers robust econometric results on the effect of the fiscal policy in Iraq from 2008 to 2024. It is evident that government spending has a positive effect on economic growth, but this effect is substantially lower than that of the traditional economic theory. The long-run elasticity is 0.485. This is substantially lower than what economists in the Middle East and North Africa region normally observe. This is attributed to institutional issues, excessive import dependence, and excessive dependence on oil revenues.

One of the interesting observations is that the government capital expenditure is much more effective than the government consumption expenditure. The government capital expenditure is 1.5 times more effective for the growth of the economy. It is therefore very important for Iraq to invest more in capital rather than consumption. Another interesting observation is that as the debt of the government increases from 12% to 52% of the GDP of Iraq, it negatively affects the economic growth of the country. The loss of potential output is around 6%.

The effectiveness of the fiscal policies is not constant. When oil prices are high and the environment is stable, the multipliers perform decently at 0.45 to 0.50. But when things become challenging, such as when oil prices fall or when there is political instability, the multipliers break down to 0.15 to 0.20. In addition, fiscal shocks do not have immediate effects on the economy. It takes more than two years for the full impact to be realized.

Core Policy Recommendations

First, Iraq should change the composition of its spending. Rather than continuing to invest heavily in government wages and current spending, the government should aim to invest more in capital spending. If the government targets a ratio of 35% to 40% of capital spending, as opposed to the current 25% to 28%, and at the same time reduces wage growth to 3% to 4% each year, it can improve the effectiveness of its fiscal stimulus by 15% to 20%. This alone can add an extra 0.8 to 1.0 percentage points of annual growth.

Second, tax administration requires significant institutional reform. Currently, Iraq's tax collection is much lower than it should be at only 3.8% of GDP, when it should realistically aim to collect between 12% and 15% with the right reforms. This requires significant effort and investment, which includes the creation of an independent tax authority, investing $300 to

$500 million over five years in modern technology and training, and introducing a value-added tax. This will amount to $15 to $20 billion over a period of more than ten years and will enable the government to close its deficit without reducing expenditure.

Third, Iraq needs fiscal rules. The budget decisions should not be taken in an ad-hoc manner, which causes uncertainty and pushes inflation. The government should follow a medium-term fiscal plan. This will involve a debt ceiling of 40 percent of GDP, a target of 2 percent of GDP for the primary deficit, and a minimum floor for capital expenditure. There should be a fiscal council to monitor the degree of compliance and submit reports quarterly. This will help create a commitment that could lower inflation expectations by 1 to 2 percent, which will boost business confidence.

Fourth, there is a need to coordinate the monetary policy with the fiscal policy. The two policies are currently working against each other. When the government is increasing spending, the central bank reduces the amount of money in circulation. This can be done by setting up a joint committee that will make the fiscal policy even more effective by between 15% to 20%, thereby adding another $2 to $3 billion to the growth stimulus.

Fifth, Iraq needs to create a sovereign wealth fund. The price of oil is very volatile and unpredictable, fluctuating by an average of $34.70 per barrel. The revenues are equally volatile. The sovereign wealth fund will help stabilize the volatility. The fund will transfer money to the treasury when the price of oil is high, i.e., when the price of oil is above $60. On the other hand, when the price of oil falls below $45, the fund will transfer money to the treasury. This will help stabilize 40% to 50% of the volatility in Iraq. It will also be easy to predict the growth of the economy and encourage investors to invest.

How to Implement These Changes

It is expected that these reforms will be carried out in three phases by the government. In the first two years, the groundwork will be laid. This means that the government will pass laws on fiscal rules and the sovereign wealth fund, initiate the process of tax modernization, and establish the fiscal council. In the third to fifth year, the "heavy lifting" would start with the completion of tax modernization, the implementation of the VAT system, and the actual change in the composition of government expenditure. In the sixth to tenth year, the system is expected to be mature with tax collection ranging from 12% to 15% of GDP, debt levels reduced to sustainable levels of 25% to 30%, and economic growth ranging from 3.5% to 4.0% per year.

Learning from Other Countries

Iraq would not be the first country to attempt this strategy. Chile, for example, created a sovereign wealth fund in the late 1980s and built up $25 billion in reserves, which is the same as $100 billion for Iraq. This strategy helped Chile have much more stable financial policies and economic growth. Another country, Norway, has taken this strategy to the next level by maintaining the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, worth $1.3 trillion, and having some of the most stable economic growth in the world. Kazakhstan and Mexico have both implemented this strategy with great success.

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Real Risks and How to Address Them

Of course, implementing this agenda will not be easy, and there will be political resistance because there are groups that will benefit from the current system and will therefore resist change. The government can deal with this by engaging the parliament at an early stage, safeguarding vulnerable groups during the transition, and seeking support from outside to give the initiative credibility. Another threat that can arise is that oil prices can fall below what has been assumed, which can lead to the exhaustion of the sovereign wealth fund. This therefore requires building large reserves and keeping the rules flexible enough to allow for genuine emergencies. Another threat that can arise is security issues, which can lead to unexpected increases in spending due to conflict . Finally, there is the threat of capacity, which is still low since these institutions are still developing in Iraq. With the help of technical assistance from the IMF, World Bank, and other countries, using a phased approach beginning with the highest priority, these problems can be remedied.

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